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Abstract
A structural rational expectations model of U.S. monetary policy is used to make
a counterfactual experiment of a strongly inﬂation averse Federal Reserve Bank.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies how U.S. output, inﬂation, and interest rates would have evolved 1965-
1999 if the Federal Reserve Bank had been more inﬂation averse. This counterfactual
experiment is done with a structural rational expectations macro model.
Similar types of counterfactual experiments are discussed in several other papers,
for instance, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1998), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and
Bergvall (2000). These experiments can tell us a great deal about how monetary policy—
and our models of monetary policy—works.
The approach I take here has several advantages, however. First, the notion of a more
inﬂation averse central bank is parameterized in terms of the bank’s objective function
rather than in terms of a decision rule. Second, results from the experiments are shown for
output and inﬂation (requires solving for the new rational expectations equilibrium), not
just the policy instruments. Third, the results for the actual paths of output and inﬂation
are shown, not just the implied unconditional variances. Fourth, the model parameters are
estimated (with maximum likelihood) on historical data, rather than just calibrated. Some
papers share one or a few of these advantages, but rarely all four.
2 A Model of Monetary Policy
Toperformthepolicyexperiment, IuseaversionofthemodelinFuhrerandMoore(1995)
(the wage contracts are one period shorter, but policy optimizes an objective function).
The IS curve for detrended log output, yt,i s
yt D 1yt−1 C 2yt−2 C rrt−1 C "yt;
where "yt is an output shock. The long ex ante real interest rate, rt, obeys an approximate
risk neutral arbitrage condition for a ten year real coupon bond
rt D
P1
sD0 .40=41/s Et .itCs − tC1Cs/=41;
where it is the annualized one quarter nominal interest rate, and t the annualized one
quarter inﬂation rate, t D 4.pt − pt−1/.
Wage contracts negotiated in t specify a ﬂat nominal wage, wt, for three quarters, but
not all contracts “survive” until tC1o rtC2. As a consequence, the fraction 0 of existing
2(in t) contracts were written in t, the fraction 1 in t − 1, and the rest in t − 2. The log
price level is the average of these wage contracts
pt D 0wt C 1wt−1 C .1 − 0 − 1/wt−2:
Nominal wage contracts are set so the current real contract wage, wt − pt, equals the
expected value of the wage contracts written during the next two periods—adjusted for
demand pressure and negative supply shocks, "pt,
wt − pt D 0 .vt C γyt/ C 1 Et .vtC1 C γytC1/ C .1 − 0 − 1/Et .vtC2 C γytC2/ C "pt;
vt D 0 .wt − pt/ C 1 .wt−1 − pt−1/ C .1 − 0 − 1/.wt−2 − pt−2/:
The Fed sets the short nominal interest rate. The wage contracting schedule makes
inﬂation expectations somewhat sticky, so the Fed can inﬂuence the ex ante real interest
rate and therefore output. This has an affect on inﬂation via the Phillips effect. The Fed
is assumed to commit to a policy rule which strikes a balance between output, inﬂation,




s C .1 − qy/2
s C qii2
sU:
3 Estimation and a Policy Experiment
The model is estimated in S¨ oderlind (2001) with the maximum likelihood method. A
guess of the parameter vector is used in a solution algorithm for rational expectations
models. This gives an optimal policy rule and a system of linear difference equations
for the model variables, which can be used in a Kalman ﬁlter to build up the likelihood
function of the data. The estimation algorithm iterates over the parameters to ﬁnd the
vector that maximizes the likelihood function. (See S¨ oderlind (1999) for a summary
of recent methods for solving and estimating rational expectations models of monetary
policy.)
The sample is quarterly U.S. data for 1966Q1 to 1995Q4 where yt is taken to be log
real GNP per capita detrended with a linear trend, t is the annualized quarterly change
in the consumer price index for urban workers, and it is the three month T-bill rate plus an
error term (which can be interpreted as a policy shock). The three shocks (demand shock,
3supply shock, and the interest rate shock) are assumed to be iid normally distributed.1
The means are subtracted from all variables before estimation since the model variables
have zero means.
Once the model is estimated, a Kalman smoothing algorithm (Harvey (1989)) is used
to make the best possible estimate of the shocks that hit the U.S. economy over the period
1965-1999, and also of the initial state of the economy in 1965Q1. This state needs to be
estimated since only parts of it are directly observable, for instance lagged output, while
other parts are not directly observable, for instance, lagged wage contracts and lagged ex
ante real interest rates.
The estimated shocks have several reassuring features. First, the inﬂation peaks in mid
and late 1970s are estimated to come from negative supply shocks. Second, the Volcker
deﬂation is not attributed to the supply or demand shocks, but to systematic monetary
policy and interest rate shocks. Third, the early 1990s shows negative demand shocks,
and the late 1990s is characterized by both positive demand and supply shocks.
The counterfactual experiment of a more inﬂation averse Fed is done by changing the
weight on output stability in the loss function, qy, from the estimated 0.82 to 0.1 and the
weight on interest rate stabilization, q f; from the estimated 0.35 to 0.1. This means that
the Fed focuses much more on inﬂation stability, even if it comes at the expense more
volatility in output and interest rates. This particular policy experiment is only meant to
capture the idea of a more inﬂation averse Fed than observed (estimated) from historical
data, but it generates changes in the standard deviations of output, inﬂation, and interest
rates which are in line with other studies. I solve for the dynamic rational expectations
equilibrium with these new parameters, and simulate the economy by starting from the
estimated state of the economy in 1965Q1 and feeding in the estimated shocks.
One effect of an inﬂation averse policy is to decrease the standard deviation of inﬂa-
tion 1965-1999 by around 25%. The estimated Phillips effect is not particularly strong
(something which is also found in several other studies, for instance, Roberts (1995)), so
decreased inﬂation volatility comes at the cost of a 40% increase in the standard deviation
of detrended output (and a and 65% increase in the standard deviation of the interest rate).
The actual and simulated macro series are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1a shows, among
other things, that an inﬂation averse Fed would have been more persistent and force-
1The estimation results are the following: in the IS curve (1; 2; r;Std("yt)) = (1.39,-0.50,-
0.55,0.84); in the loss function (qy;qi) = (0.82,0.35); in the price equations (0; 1;γ;Std("pt)) =
(0.62,0.29,0.0019,0.19); and the T-bill Std error is 1.41.


















Figure 1: Actual and simulated U.S. interest rates, output, and inﬂation. The interest rate
is the three-month T-bill rate; output is log real GNP per capita detrended with a linear trend;
inﬂation is the annualized quarterly change in the consumer price index for urban workers.
ful (3.5% higher interest rate) in ﬁghting inﬂation after the ﬁrst oil price shock, reacted
quicker and more (6% higher interest rate) to the second oil price shock, and pursued a
looser monetary policy during the second half of the 1990s when inﬂation was low.
The cost of this policy shows up in Figure 1b as long and large recessions around the
oil price shocks. In particular, most of the ﬁrst half of the 1980s would have been a deep
recession. On the other hand, the looser monetary policy in the late 1990s would have
boosted the economy further.
These movements in output would have helped keeping inﬂation under control, even
if inﬂation ﬁghting gives little immediate payoff. Figure 1c shows that inﬂation in 1973
5and early 1974 would not have been lower than in data, but inﬂation in 1975-1976 would
have been some 3% lower. Similarly, inﬂation in 1979 would not have been much lower
than in data, but in 1980-1981 it would again have been around 3% lower.
There are two reasons for this result. First, the inﬂation inertia, built into the model
as overlapping wage contracts, means that part of today’s inﬂation is due to contracts
written in earlier periods: the inﬂation response to a monetary policy is sluggish. Second,
the Phillips effect is not very strong, so it would take a really deep recession to counter
the strong inﬂation impulses of the oil price shocks. The policy maker in this model has
a quadratic loss function and is therefore more willing to create a mild but long recession
than a very deep but short depression.
Should we believe these arguments? The degree of inﬂation inertia and fairly weak
Phillips effect are estimated from historical data, and similar results are found in many
other studies, so that part of the argument is probably robust. However, the degree of
convexity of the loss function is not estimated: the quadratic form was assumed a priori.
Althoughthisformisverypopularintheoreticalwork(mostlyforreasonsofconvenience)
and has some intuitive appeal, it remains an open issue if it is a good approximation of
policy makers preferences.
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